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ABSTRACT
The widespread usage of digital video surveillance systems
has increased the concerns for privacy violation. Since video
surveillance systems are invasive, it is a challenge to find
an acceptable balance between privacy of the public under
surveillance and security related features of the systems.
Many privacy protection tools have been proposed for pre-
serving privacy, ranging from such simple methods like blur-
ring or pixelization to more advanced like scrambling and
geometrical transform based filters. However, for a given fil-
ter implemented in a practical video surveillance system, it is
necessary to know the strength with which the filter should be
applied to protect privacy reliably. Assuming an automated
surveillance system, this paper objectively investigates sev-
eral privacy protection filters with varying strength degrees
and determines their optimal strength values to achieve pri-
vacy protection. To this end, five privacy filters were applied
to images from FERET dataset and the performance of three
recognition algorithms was evaluated. The results show that
different privacy protection filters influence the accuracy of
different versions of face recognition differently and this in-
fluence depends both on the robustness of the recognition and
the type of distortion filter.
Index Terms—Privacy protection, video surveillance, se-
curity optimization, privacy strength
1. INTRODUCTION
More and more video surveillance systems are adopting pri-
vacy protection mechanisms in response to the public con-
cern over unwelcome intrusion into personal lives. These
protection techniques or privacy filters vary from such sim-
ple approaches like blurring, pixelization, or masking to more
advanced methods, including encryption [1], scrambling [2],
anonymization [3], and geometrical-based [4] approaches.
Most of the privacy filters distort a specified visual region
in image or video with the goal to obfuscate sensitive personal
information. Typical filter has a certain level of strength, for
instance, the value of standard deviation of a Gaussian blur.
This work has been conducted in the framework of EC funded Network
of Excellence VideoSense and COST IC1003 European Network on Quality
of Experience in Multimedia Systems and Services QUALINET.
The strength of such filter is often chosen in an ad hoc man-
ner, by following common sense considerations such that the
resulted image would be pleasant, less distracting, or would
retain some general visual form. Another approach [5] is to
choose a privacy filter’s strength in such a way that intelli-
gibility of video surveillance is preserved. However, in sce-
narios when the privacy protection has higher priority, for in-
stance in people counting surveillance applications, highway
monitoring, or crowd analysis, a filter’s strength should be
constrained to insure certain minimal level of privacy protec-
tion.
In this paper, we assume an automated video surveillance
system that relies on video analytics for its operation. This as-
sumption is reasonable, given how widespread and largely de-
ployed the surveillance systems are today, which forces them
to rely on video analytics in order to reduce the cost of the
surveillance and increase their scalability. In such systems,
privacy can be considered to be well protected if the per-
formance of a privacy intrusive video analytic, such as face
recognition, drops below an acceptable level. Hence, in a
practical surveillance system, given a privacy filter, one needs
to determine the constraint value of the filter’s strength, which
would insure the required level of privacy protection. And
once this privacy level is achieved, other considerations, such
as intelligibility or pleasantness, can be accommodated for.
Therefore, we consider five distortion-based privacy fil-
ters with varying strength parameters, including Gaussian
blurring with varying standard deviation, pixelization with
varying size of the averaging block, masking with vary-
ing opacity, warping [6] with varying number of tiles, and
morphing [4] with varying intensity level. We investigate the
influence of the filters’ strength parameters on performance of
three state-of-art face recognition algorithms implemented in
OpenCV: based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [7],
referred to as ‘Eigen’ in the paper, based on Linear Discrim-
inant Analysis (LDA) [8], referred to as ‘Fisher’, and based
on local features (LBP) [9], referred to as ‘LBPH’. We use
publicly available FERET dataset [10], which is a common
dataset to test the performance of face recognition algorithms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
related work. Section 3 describes the experimental method-
ology of finding strength for each pair of privacy filter and
recognition algorithm. Section 4 provides and discusses the
evaluation results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1: An example image (a) from FERET dataset with the following privacy protection filters applied: (b) blurring with 17
kernel size, (c) pixelization with 16 averaging block size, (d) masking with 0.7 opacity, (e) warping with strength 10, and (f)
morphing with intensity 0.4.
2. RELATEDWORK
Newton et al. [11] argued that several primitive privacy filters
cannot adequately protect from the successful face recogni-
tion, because recognition algorithms are robust. The robust-
ness of face recognition and detection algorithms to primi-
tive distortions is also reported in [12]. In the work by Du-
faux et al. [13], a framework is defined to evaluate the per-
formance of face recognition algorithms applied to images
altered by various obfuscation methods, based on the Face
Identification Evaluation System (FIES). Experiments using
the FERET database showed the ineffectiveness of naı¨ve face
obfuscation techniques such as pixelization and blurring in
hindering recognition performance. The authors argue that
more sophisticated scrambling techniques are more effective
in impeding face recognition. The above studies assume a
certain strength level of the privacy protection tools such as
blurring or pixelization. However, in a practical surveillance
system, one would use the largest possible strength of, for in-
stance, pixelization filter to make sure a given recognition al-
gorithm still fails. It is also important to understand that each
recognition algorithm would have different tolerance levels
for different privacy protection filters.
Several works [5, 14] also considered the problem of find-
ing the balance between the ability of human guards to per-
form a surveillance task and adequate protection of privacy.
The authors argued that since privacy is a subjective notion,
the evaluation should be done subjectively. Then, the au-
thors define a subjective methodology for evaluation of pri-
vacy protection tools and propose a subjective evaluation pro-
tocol, focusing on two important aspects: (i) how much of the
privacy is protected by such a tool and (ii) how much it im-
pacts the efficiency of the underlying surveillance task (intel-
ligibility). The pixelization filter shows the best performance
in terms of balancing between privacy protection and allow-
ing sufficient intelligibility. Masking filter, instead, demon-
strates the highest privacy protection with low incorrectness
and high uncertainty, which can be suitable for the higher se-
curity surveillance applications. This paper differs in the def-
inition of privacy protection, because the goal now is to find a
strong enough privacy filter that decreases the accuracy of an
intrusive video analytic. This assumption results in privacy
being an objective notion, which is applicable in automated
surveillance systems.
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Fig. 2: Recognition results for blurring filter
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Fig. 3: Recognition results for pixelization filter
Another study [15] considered video surveillance system
using video analytics but the work was focused on finding the
privacy-intelligibility tradeoff using objective metrics without
the consideration to insure the reliability of privacy protection
algorithms. This paper considers privacy protection as a prac-
tical goal and demonstrates the importance of carefully select-
ing the strength of privacy protection filters that are adequate
to the video analytics employed by the surveillance system.
3. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
We investigate the influence of strength parameters of sev-
eral privacy filters, such as Gaussian blurring, pixelization,
masking, warping [6], and morphing [4], on the performance
of three recognition algorithms: PCA based [7] referred to
as ‘Eigen’, LDA based [8] referred to as ‘Fisher’, and LBP
based [9] referred to as ‘LBPH’, to determine the minimal
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Fig. 4: Recognition results for masking filter
threshold strength values that would ensure adequate privacy
protection. Figure 1 demonstrates the result of privacy filters
applied to an example image.
In the experiments, we use a subset of 200 images from
FERET dataset [10], which consists of 14′051 gray scale im-
ages of persons with clearly visible faces and different facial
expressions under various environmental conditions, includ-
ing illumination, orientation, appearance and age variations.
We use the recommended subset ‘fa’ as the gallery set and
subset ‘fb’ as the probe set for face recognition algorithms in
all evaluation tests. The recognition is performed on the facial
regions detected by Viola-Jones face detection [16].
The experiments are conducted as follows. For a given
privacy filter, we change the strength of the filter with a small
step and for each strength value, the faces from the ‘fb’ subset
of the dataset are distorted by this filter accordingly. A given
recognition algorithm is then applied to the distorted faces
and rank 1 value of the Cumulative Matching Characteristic
(CMS) is computed, which determines algorithm’s accuracy
for the current filter’s strength. Testing different strength val-
ues, we vary the value of the standard deviation of Gaussian
for blurring filter from 1 to 90 with step 3, the size of the block
for pixelization filter from 1 to 100 with step 3, the opacity of
masking filter from 0 to 1.0 with step 0.02, the number of tiles
in warping filter from 25 to 1 with step 1 (the lower number
of tiles results in a stronger filter), and the intensity parameter
of morphing filter from 0 to 1.0 with step 0.04, using fixed
interpolation value of 0.8, as recommended in [4].
4. RESULTS
Figures 2-6 show recognition results for all filters and recog-
nition algorithms. In each figure, vertical axis corresponds to
the accuracy of recognition, and horizontal axis corresponds
to different strength values of a privacy filter. For each fil-
ter, there exist a strength value, termed critical strength, that
leads to a significant decrease in accuracy of a given recog-
nition algorithm and, consequently, to an increase in privacy
protection. We selected 0.5 as a significantly low accuracy
value, since only half of the faces are correctly recognized,
which is indicated by the dashed horizontal line in the figures.
Hence, the critical strength values for each filter-recognition
algorithm pair are indicated by vertical dashed lines.
From the figures, we can note that all privacy filters can
significantly decrease accuracy of the recognition, however,
different filters affect different recognition algorithms differ-
ently. For instance, for simple filters (blurring, pixelization,
and masking), critical strength values vary drastically across
recognition algorithms, and this behavior needs to be taken
into account in a practical surveillance system. LBPH demon-
strates significantly faster decrease compared to Eigen and
Fisher algorithms for blurring and pixelization (see Figures 2
and 3), while for masking filter the situation is reversed. On
the other hand, more advanced warping and morphing filters
are more stable in the way they affect the accuracy of recog-
nition, as the similarity between curves in each of Figures 5
and 6 and the less varying critical strength values illustrate.
Overall, masking seems to be the most suitable among simple
filters for privacy protection, because it can reduce recogni-
tion accuracy to near zero when using opacity value larger
than 0.8. Morphing filter (see Figure 6) demonstrates sim-
ilarly strong effect on the recognition for intensity strength
values larger than 0.8. However, because morphing is re-
versible (the original face can be recovered securely) and it
decreases accuracy of all recognition algorithms in a similar
and nearly linear fashion, it is the best choice for privacy pro-
tection among all evaluated privacy filters. Warping (see Fig-
ure 5) seems to be the least suitable filter for automated video
surveillance, because it affects recognition only at very high
distortion levels (low number of tiles), whereas it is signifi-
cantly more complex than simple blurring, pixelization, and
masking filters.
Considering performance of recognition algorithm, LBPH
stands out from others as it ‘reacts’ in an unpredictable way to
different privacy filters. For instance, from Figure 2 it is clear
that LBPH is very sensitive to blurring and quite sensitive to
pixelization, which, as a side result, means that LBPH may
not perform well on images compressed with JPEG (pixeliza-
tion artifacts) and JPEG 2000 (blurring artifacts) encoders.
This is somewhat surprising since LBPH algorithm is popular
among researchers for its high recognition accuracy. LBPH
is also unstable to the changing strengths values of masking
(see Figure 4) and morphing (see Figure 6) filters. A possible
explanation of such instability is that both filters uniformly
change the intensity values of all pixels in an image, which,
in turn, non-uniformly affects histograms of local pixel pat-
terns (the core of LBPH recognition), resulting in the high
variations in recognition accuracy even for small changes of
a strength value.
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Fig. 5: Recognition results for warping filter
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Morphing strength
 
 
Fisher
Eigen
LBPH
Fig. 6: Recognition results for morphing filter
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, by using five different privacy filters and three
recognition algorithms, we have demonstrated the impor-
tance of careful selection of strength values for each filter-
recognition algorithm pair. For the practical systems this
findings means that one has to constraint a selected privacy
protection filter with a determined strength value to ensure
privacy protection. It also means that the value highly de-
pends on a given video analytic, which in case of our evalu-
ations is a recognition algorithm. We also demonstrated that
filters affect recognition algorithms differently and morphing
filter seems to be the best choice among the evaluated privacy
filters.
As a future extension, the subjective evaluations should
also be conducted to understand the difference between ‘per-
ception’ of privacy by video analytics and human visual sys-
tem. The investigation can also include other surveillance sce-
narios such as object tracking or event detection.
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